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Article 9

COMMENTS

POST CONVICTION REMEDIES
Federal habeas corpus relief first became available to state
prisoners in 1867,1 when the Judiciary Act, 2 which originally applied only to federal prisoners, was amended. Historically, habeas
corpus inquiry had been restricted to the question of whether the
convicting tribunal had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the subject matter of the offense.3 However, the scope of
the federal writ has been gradually expanded until it is now used
to test the constitutional validity of a conviction. It has been
stated that: ". . . ever since Brown v. Allen 4 the Supreme Court
has continued to assume, without discussion, that it is the purpose
of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to redetermine the merits
of federal constitutional questions decided in state criminal proceedings." 5
However, the Supreme Court has placed several limitations
upon the availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners.
The first and most important of these restrictions was enunciated
in Ex parte Hawk,6 which established the rule that a state prisoner
must first exhaust his state remedies before seeking relief in the
federal courts. The exhaustion of state remedies requirement is
now codified.7 It is evident, however, that exhaustion is not required if there is either an absence of an available state corrective
process or if the circumstances render the existing state remedies
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." This requirement has been narrowed by the Court to the point that only those
remedies available to the petitioner at the time he seeks federal
habeas corpus review must be exhausted. 9 Thus, a failure to seek
a state remedy which is no longer available will not bar federal
relief.' 0
1 Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
2

The federal habeas

corpus act is now 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958).
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.

3 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).

4 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
5 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,76 Huv.L. R.v.441, 500 (1963).
6 321 U.S. 114 (1944). Hawk was convicted of murder in Nebraska in
1936. The extended litigation in this case illustrates the dilemma
which may face a state prisoner. For a history of this litigation, see
Note, The Judicial Obstacle Course, 29 NEB. L. REV. 445 (1951).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
8 Ibid.
9 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
10 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Petitioner Noia did not appeal his

state court murder conviction because of fear that a new trial would
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A failure to raise a constitutional issue in the state proceedings
may result in a waiver of that right and preclude relief by way of
federal habeas corpus.'

However, to be effective, such a waiver

must be made only by the petitioner himself, and not by his counsel, and will be effective against him only if made knowingly. 2
In Darr v. Burford,'13 the Supreme Court established the requirement that an application for certiorari to review the denial of
the state remedy must be denied by the Supreme Court before federal habeas corpus would lie. But the Court has removed this
restriction, stating it to be only "an unnecessary burdensome step
in the orderly processing of the federal claims of those convicted
of state crimes."' 4
As a result of the liberal rules for the entertaining of the federal habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners, "there has been a
tremendous increase in habeas corpus applications in federal courts.
Indeed, in the Supreme Court alone they have increased threefold
in the last 15 years."' 5
This resort to the federal courts has disturbed the states.
"The desirability of minimizing the necessity for resort by state
prisoners to federal habeas corpus is not to be denied."' 6 Dean
Griswold of the Harvard Law School has stated that "the basic
responsibility for the enforcement of the criminal law remains with
the States ....

What is needed now is for the States to accept this

responsibility, and to adopt means to carry it out.' 7 The exodus of
state prisoners to the federal courts to seek relief has led to considerable action on the part of the states in order to provide a suitable remedy in the state courts. This expansion of the available
state remedies for a prisoner who claims that he has been denied a
federal constitutional right is the subject of this comment.

11
12

18
14

15
16
17

result in the death penalty rather than the life sentence which he had
received at his original trial. The principles established in Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Fay v. Noia, supra, and Saunders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), have been codified by recent amendments to
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 (1958). The President signed Public Law 89-711,
89th Congress, on November 2, 1966. These amendments "undertake
to codify the principles of the trilogy." White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp.
42, 60 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (addendum to memorandum opinion).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
339 U.S. 200, 210 (1950).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437 (1963).
Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 338 (1965) (concurring opinion).
Id. at 344 (concurring opinion).
Address by Dean Griswold, Cleveland Bar Association, May 13, 1965.

COMMENTS
I. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
The states have always permitted one who has been convicted
of a crime two courses to follow in having his conviction reviewed.
These are direct review, such as a writ of error or appeal to a
higher tribunal, and collateral attack of the conviction, traditionally by the writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis. Historically,
habeas corpus was the proper writ for challenging the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the defendant or the subject matter
of the offense. It thus developed into the writ by which a person
unlawfully imprisoned could obtain his release. 8 Traditionally, it
could not be used to challenge as unlawful a future imprisonment 9
(the doctrine of "prematurity"), or an imprisonment already completed (the doctrine of "mootness"), because "without restraint of
liberty, the writ will not issue.120 So restricted, habeas corpus was
only available to secure release when the petitioner was presently
imprisoned and the imprisonment was being challenged as unlawful. In addition, the remedy was only available to attack an error
appearing on the face of the record.
The writ or error, coram nobis developed in order that the court
itself might correct certain errors in the process of the convicting
court, many times these were errors committed by the clerks, or
related to matters of fact.21 Thus, it came to be the method of
correcting errors of law not appearing on the record.
The narrow grounds for granting these two common law remedies left a great many situations in which a petitioner had no means
of attacking a conviction as void on constitutional grounds, thus
forcing prisoners to resort to the available relief in the federal
courts, and causing radical changes in the nature and extent of the
remedies available to a state prisoner in the state courts.
II. STATUTORY REMEDIES
In Young v. Ragen,22 the Supreme Court stated that the states
must provide prisoners with a "clearly defined method by which
they may raise claims of denial of federal rights." The first state
to comply with this mandate by enacting a broad statutory remedy
was Illinois.23 Subsequently, eleven other states-Maine, 24 Mary18 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw

227 (7th ed. 1955).

19 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
20

Id. at 138.
op. cit. supra note 18, at 224.
337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949).
ILL. AroN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to -7 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
M. REV. STAT. AN'N. tit. 14, §§ 5501 to 46 (1964).

21 1 HOLDSWORTH,
22
23

24
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land, 25 Nebraska,2 6 New Mexico, 27 Ohio, 28 Oregon, 29 Pennsyl34
3
32
vania, 30 South Dakota, 31 Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming
-have passed broad post conviction acts or have expanded existing
remedies by statute. 35 In addition, a number of states have provided similar relief by means of rule of court.36
The Nebraska Post Conviction Act provides that a prisoner in
custody under sentence who claims a right to be released because
his conviction is void or voidable due to the denial or infringement
of rights under the state or federal constitution may file a motion
in the court which imposed the sentence, asking the court to vacate
or set the conviction aside. This provides a means whereby the
Nebraska prisoner may raise any claims of denial of a federal constitutional right in the Nebraska courts. However, it seems that
there are situations in which federal habeas corpus would lie but
Nebraska has not yet provided for a remedy. The Nebraska procedure is available to a "prisoner in custody under sentence."
If an individual was sentenced to serve two or more sentences
consecutively for separate crimes, and he sought to attack the conviction for which the second sentence was imposed on constitutional
grounds while serving the first sentence, it is questionable whether
he could file a motion under the Nebraska Post Conviction Act.
Likewise, an application for habeas corpus would be "premature"
because the present imprisonment is perfectly legal. Under these
circumstances, he may be able to obtain relief in the federal courts
since it has been held that the3 7"prematurity" doctrine will not bar
resort to federal habeas corpus.
art. 27, §§ 645-A to -J (Supp. 1964).
29-3001 to 04 (Supp. 1965).
ANN. § 41-15-8 (1966).

25 MD. ANN. CODE

26 NEB. REV. STAT. §§
27

N.M.

STAT.

OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.21 to .24 (Page Supp. 1966).
29 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510 to .680 (1963).
30 PA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to -14 (Supp. 1966).
28

31 S.D. Laws c. 121 (1966). (effective July 1, 1967).
32 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7131 to 37 (Supp. 1966).
33 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.130 (Supp. 1966).
34 Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-408.1 to .8 (Supp. 1963).
35 Correspondence indicates that the states of Iowa, Nevada, Rhode Island,
Utah, and Virginia are currently conducting studies relative to legislation in this area.
36 ALA. SUP. CT. R. 35(b); ARx. SUP. CT. PER CURIAM ORDER, Oct. 18, 1965;

R.

PROc. 35, 135; DEL. SUPER. CT. (CaIM. PROC.) R. 35; FLA.
R. 1; Ky. R. CRim. PROC. 11.42; Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.26; N.J.
R. OF SUPER. AND CTY. CTs. 3:10 A-2; N.M.R. CIV. PROC.
93; OKLA. RULES 26.

COLO.

CRIn.

CRIM. PROC.
CRIM. PROC.
87

Martin v. Virginia, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).

COMMENTS
The Nebraska Post Conviction Act also provides that an order
sustaining or denying a motion under the act shall be a final order
and appealable to the Nebraska Supreme Court, and further provides that counsel may be appointed by the district court, but not
that counsel must be appointed.38
The remedy provided by the Nebraska Post Conviction Act is
expressly stated to be cumulative and not concurrent with any
other existing remedies. 39 Therefore, a Nebraska prisoner now has
three possible means of collaterally attacking a conviction: habeas
corpus,40 coram nobis,41 and a motion under the post conviction act.
Although the post conviction act does provide a further remedy for
a prisoner who claims the denial of a federal constitutional right,
it does not simplify the procedure since the petitioner must decide
which of the remedies is available to him. It has been argued
that the only way for a Nebraska prisoner to exhaust his state
remedies is to file three proceedings concurrently, all alleging the
same grievance: a petition for habeas corpus filed in the district
court of the district where the petitioner is imprisoned; a petition
for coram nobis relief filed in the district court where the petitioner
was convicted; and a motion for relief under the post conviction
42
act, also filed in the district where the conviction took place.
This aspect of the Nebraska Post Conviction Act is common to several of the different states' enactments. Of those states which have
enacted post conviction relief statutes, only Maine, Pennsylvania,
and South Dakota provide that relief under the statutory procedure shall replace and include any other form of collateral attack.
The Maryland enactment would seem to have the same effect since
it specifically abrogates the right to appeal from the denial of an
application for habeas corpus or coram nobis relief.
III. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
In several of the states which have not provided broader post
conviction remedies by either statute or rule of court, the state
courts have expanded the writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis
through widening decisions to offer a remedy in a situation where
none was available before.
38

For an analysis of this feature of the Nebraska Post Conviction Act
see Lake, The Echo of Clarence Gideon's Trumpet, 44 NEE. L. REV. 751,
769-70 (1965).

39 NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 29-3003 (Supp. 1965).
40 NEB. REv. STAT. § § 29-2801-24 (Reissue

1964).
41 Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1949).
42 See Lake, supra note 38, at 770.

140

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 1 (1967)

Some courts, while retaining the restriction that the only basis
upon which a conviction may be attacked by habeas corpus is
lack of jurisdiction in the convicting tribunal, have narrowed the
requirements for proper jurisdiction. These courts have reasoned
that a court cannot properly have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person if the defendant has been denied a constitutional right.43 Thus, it has been concluded that the denial of a
constitutional right deprives a court of jurisdiction ab initio, making
habeas corpus available in the state courts to question the constitutional validity of the conviction.
At least one state, Indiana, has applied the above reasoning to
an application for writ of coram nobis. The court found that the
constitutional error did not appear 44on the record, thus making coram nobis available in that situation.
The courts of some of the states have partially abandoned the
technical restrictions placed upon the availability of habeas corpus
which have plagued state petitioners. The doctrine of "prematurity," that the petitioner must be presently incarcerated under the
conviction that he is attacking in order to seek habeas corpus, has
been abrogated in some states by decisions granting habeas corpus
not be the release
where the effect of the granting of the writ will
45
of the petitioner from a present imprisonment.
Several courts have gone much farther than merely abrogating
some of the technical requirements of the traditional remedies. A
notable decision in this respect is State v. Tahash,46 where the Minnesota Supreme Court, "because of the absence of any statute providing a postconviction procedure," 47 found it to be "necessary to
43

Wojculewicz v. Cummings, 145 Conn. 11, 138 A.2d 512, cert. denied 356
U.S. 969 (1958); Ex parte Rose, 122 N.J.L. 507, 6 A.2d 388 (Sup. Ct.

1939); Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Ore. 283, 251 P.2d 87 (1952); In re
Homer, 19 Wash.2d 51, 141 P.2d 151 (1943).
44
45

46
47

Huffman, supra, was de-

cided before Oregon enacted its post conviction relief statute, supra
note 29.
State v. Blackford Cir. Ct., 229 Ind. 3, 95 N.E.2d 556 (1950).
In re Tartar, 52 Cal.2d 250, 339 P.2d 553 (1959); In re Chapman, 43
Cal.2d 385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954); State v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 466, 139
N.W.2d 161 (1965); Commonwealth v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613
(1965). Since the Myers decision, supra, Pennsylvania has enacted a
post conviction relief statute, supra note 30. In addition to these state
court decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has indicated that the "prematurity" doctrine will no longer
bar federal habeas corpus relief. Martin v. Virginia, 349 F.2d 781 (4th
Cir. 1965).
272 Minn. 466, 139 N.W.2d 161 (1965).
Id. at 469, 139 N.W.2d at 161.

COMMENTS
regard habeas corpus as a postconviction procedure by which a
convicted prisoner can obtain an evidentiary hearing and determination of any claimed violation of fundamental rights, including
The court conthose guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 4
cluded that: "[P]ending enactment of a postconviction-procedure
statute which will meet constitutional requirements, habeas corpus
is available to a convicted prisoner for the purpose of securing a
hearing and determination of any claim of denial of Federal constitutional guarantees.149 Thus, the Minnesota court has expanded
the writ of habeas corpus into a broad post conviction remedy, by
doing away with all of the traditional limitations of that ancient
writ. Other state courts, in the face of inaction on the part of the
legislatures in enacting broad post conviction remedies, have expanded habeas corpus50 or coram nobis 51 to conform to the federal standards.
Such broad interpretation and expansion of existing remedies
serves to provide relief in the state courts where the legislatures
have failed to act. It does so without adding an additional remedy
to the existing framework, as, for example, the Nebraska Post Conviction Act has done. However, it may prove that such judicial
expansion of post conviction remedies will retard any motivation
for legislative action in this area. In the field of adjudication of
constitutional claims, a statutory procedure is preferable. An expansion of traditional remedies on a case-by-case basis does not
clearly forecast whether the remedy will be available in a given
situation. In addition, a broad declaration by a court in respect to
the scope of a collateral attack remedy is subject to being limited
to the facts of the particular case. A statute can clearly delimit
the scope of the remedy provided, as no court decision can. Judicial expansion to meet the federal standards has also been criticized
instrumenas tending to make the state courts "mere subordinate
52
talities of the federal judicial establishment.1
IV.

CONCLUSION

Recent decisions in the area of individual rights and the avail48

Ibid.

49

Id. at 471, 139 N.W.2d at 164.

50 Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Ex parte Bush, 166
Tex. Crim. 259, 313 S.W.2d 287 (1958). Kentucky has since provided
post conviction relief by rule of court, supra note 36.
51 In re Broom's Petition, 251 Miss. 25, 168 So.2d 44 (1964); People v.
Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965).
52 People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 83, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 847, 204 N.E.2d
179, 1C6 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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ability of a federal forum, in which an individual may test his
claim of the denial of a federal constitutional right, makes certain
the states' awareness of the necessity of providing a suitable remedy that will not abate. The responsibility of the states in this
area is clear: to provide prisoners some "clearly defined method
by which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights. '53 In
enacting new post conviction relief statutes the ends of expediency
and justice would be better served if one comprehensive remedy
were provided, encompassing and abrogating all other separate
means of collateral attack. Under such a statute, the petitioner
would not be faced with the choice of concurrent remedies such as
exist in Nebraska today.
The availability of the remedies provided should not be unduly
restricted by the requirement that the petitioner be in custody at
the time of the motion. The conviction itself is surely enough to
entitle an individual to relief and a chance to clear his name if his
constitutional rights have been infringed, regardless of whether he
be free on bail, on parol, or serving another lawful sentence. If
this problem is not met, the state will not have provided a complete remedy, and the resort by state prisoners to federal habeas
corpus will continue.
Dennis C. Karnopp, '67

53 Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949).

